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Abstract
This paper describes a simple and efficient Binary Byzantine faulty tolerant consensus algo-
rithm using a weak round coordinator and the partial synchrony assumption to ensure liveness.
In the algorithm, non-faulty nodes perform an initial broadcast followed by a executing a series
of rounds consisting of a single message broadcast until termination. Each message is accompa-
nied by a cryptographic proof of its validity. In odd rounds the binary value 1 can be decided,
in even round 0. Up to one third of the nodes can be faulty and termination is ensured within
a number of round of a constant factor of the number of faults. Experiments show termination
can be reached in less than 200 milliseconds with 300 Amazon EC2 instances spread across 5
continents even with partial initial disagreement.
1 Introduction and related work.
Binary byzantine consensus concerns the problem of getting a set of distinct processes distributed
across a network to agree on a single binary value 0 or 1 where processes can fail in arbitrary ways.
It is well known that this problem is impossible in an asynchronous network with at least one faulty
process [19]. To get around this, algorithms can employ randomization [1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 20, 23, 27, 31,
33, 35], or rely on an additional synchrony assumption. This work assumes partial synchrony [15, 16]
which ensures that after some point in time there exists an (unknown) upper bound on message
delay and difference in speed between processes. Furthermore, the algorithm assumes that less
than one third of the processes are faulty and ensures termination in O(t) messages steps, both of
which are well known lower bounds [24, 18].
While there are many algorithms that solve this problem with the same bounds and assump-
tions [15, 16], this algorithm focuses on simplicity and efficiency. Namely, it starts with each process
broadcasting an initial proposal, then executing a series of rounds that consist of broadcasting a
single message then waiting to receive a threshold of valid messages from other processes. In the
good case agreement happens in the first round. To ensure termination with the benefit of the
partial synchrony assumption, the algorithm uses a weak round coordinator [11]. This coordinator
is used to help agreement by suggesting a value to decide when both 0 and 1 are valid. While
classic round coordinators [7, 16] will rely on the coordinator for termination in all cases, the weak
∗This work was partially done while Tyler Crain was a research assistant at The University of Sydney, supported
by the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number 180104030).
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round coordinator is not needed for termination in the expected case. Note that this is a practical
distinction as the bounds for termination are not effected.
The design of the algorithm is primarily based on two previous algorithms; [8] and [11]. Sim-
ilar to [8], a set of cryptographic signatures are included with each message proving its validity.
Differently [8] uses randomization for termination and each process broadcasts several messages
per round. Similar to [11], the algorithm can decide 1 in odd rounds or 0 in even rounds, uses a
weak round coordinator, and assumes partial synchrony for termination. Differently, [11] has the
advantage of not requiring cryptographic signatures, but requires processes to broadcast several
messages per round. Note that the design of [11] is based off of the randomized algorithm of [27].
While the binary consensus problem only allows process to agree on a single binary value,
there exist many reductions to multi-value consensus [28, 29, 36, 37] allowing processes to agree
on arbitrary values. Furthermore many algorithms [3, 10] exists that solve multi-value consensus
directly with the same assumptions. Additionally algorithms exists that make many different
assumptions about the model such as synchrony [17], different fault models [25, 26, 32] solve different
definitions of consensus [30], and so on.
2 A Byzantine Computation Model.
This section describes the assumed computation model.
Asynchronous processes. The system is made up of a set Π of n asynchronous sequential
processes, namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}; i is called the “index” of pi. “Asynchronous” means that each
process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary with time and remains unknown to the other
processes. “Sequential” means that a process executes one step at a time. This does not prevent it
from executing several threads with an appropriate multiplexing. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y
are used to say that pi belongs to the set Y .
Communication network. The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an
asynchronous reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on
message transfer delays, but these delays are finite. “Reliable” means that the network does not
lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that any pair of processes is
connected by a bidirectional channel. A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking
the primitive “send tag(m) to pj”, where tag is the type of the message and m its content. To
simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to itself. A process pi
receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. The macro-operation broadcast tag(m)
is used as a shortcut for “for each pi ∈ Π do send tag(m) to pj end for”.
Signatures. Asymmetric cryptography allow processes to sign messages. Each process pi has a
public key known by everyone and a private key known only by pi. All messages are signed using
the private key can be validated by any process with the corresponding public key, allowing the
process to identify the signer of the message. Signatures are assumed to be unforgeable. A process
will ignore any message that is malformed or contains an invalid signature.
Failure model. Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior [32]. A Byzantine process
is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary
messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine
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processes can collude to “pollute” the computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same con-
tent, while they should send messages with distinct content if they were non-faulty). A process that
exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Let us notice that, as
unforgeable signatures are used no Byzantine process can impersonate another process. Byzantine
processes can control the network by modifying the order in which messages are received, but they
cannot postpone forever message receptions.
Additional synchrony assumption. It is well-known that there is no consensus algorithm
ensuring both safety and liveness properties in fully asynchronous message-passing systems in which
even a single process may crash [19]. As the crash failure model is less severe than the Byzantine
failure model, the consensus impossibility remains true if processes may commit Byzantine failures.
To circumvent such an impossibility, and ensure the consensus termination property, we enrich
the model with additional synchrony assumptions as follows: After some finite time, there exists
an (unknown) upper bound on message transfer delays. Furthermore there is an (unknown) upper
bound on the difference in speeds between non-faulty processes. This partial synchrony assumption
is denoted 3Synch [15, 16].
3 Binary Byzantine Consensus.
3.1 The Binary Consensus Problem.
In this problem processes input a value to the algorithm, called their proposal, run an algorithm
consisting of several rounds, and eventually output a value called their decision. Let V be the set
of values that can be proposed. While V can contain any number (≥ 2) of values in multi-valued
consensus, it contains only two values in binary consensus, e.g., V = {0, 1}. Assuming that each
non-faulty process proposes a value, the binary Byzantine consensus (BBC) problem is for each of
them to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties are satisfied:
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
Notations.
• The acronym BAMPn,t[∅] is used to denote the basic Byzantine Asynchronous Message-
Passing computation model; ∅ means that there is no additional assumption.
• The basic computation model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted
BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
• The computation model strengthened with the partial synchrony constraint 3Synch is de-
noted BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch].
• A signature of process i is θi
• A message m signed by process i is (m, θi)
3
3.2 A Safe and Live Consensus Algorithm in BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch].
Message types. The following message types are used by the consensus.
• aux[r](v). An aux message contains a round number r and a binary value v.
• 〈(aux[r](v), θi), proofs〉. A tuple containing an aux message signed by process i and a set
proofs containing signed aux messages from a previous round that are used to prove v is a
valid binary proposal for round r.
Valid Notation. For a given round r ≥ 1 a binary value b is valid if b has been proposed by a
non-faulty process and ¬b has not been decided in any round before r. An 〈(aux[r](v), θi), proofs〉
is valid if binary value v is valid in round r. The following section describes a function that is used
to compute the validity of a message given r, v, and proofs as input.
Variables. The following variables are used throughout all rounds of the consensus.
• ri. Current round number of process i.
• aux values i. Set of valid signed aux messages received by process i throughout all rounds of
the consensus.
• timersi. A map from a round to a timer at process i. There are two timers per round so
the timers for round r are entries r × 2 and r × 2 + 1 in the map. Timer variables can be
started then expire after a predetermined amount of time (see Section 3.2.1 for how times are
chosen). Starting a timer that has already started or expired is a no-op.
Algorithm description. Figures 1 and 2 describe the pseudo-code for the algorithm. The
bin propose operation of Figure 1 contains the main loop of the algorithm. The perform broadcast
procedure describes the code used to prepare and broadcast valid signed aux messages for each
round. The lines 22-26 handle the reception of signed aux messages. The is valid predicate of
Figure 2 describes the procedure used to check if a binary value is valid for a given round and a
set of signed aux messages.
To start the consensus, each process pi calls bin propose with its initial binary proposal vi
(Figure 1). Line 01 initializes local variables, then on Line 02 the process sends an a signed aux
message with round 0, binary value vi, and an empty set for proofs as any round 0 message is
considered to be valid. The process then repeats the while loop of Lines 03-12 for each round.
A round starts by incrementing the processes round counter on Line 04. If the process pi is the
round coordinator (i.e. i = (ri mod n)) it then invokes perform broadcast (line 05) to generate and
broadcast a valid signed aux message. Otherwise the process waits for a timeout (line 06) before
invoking perform broadcast (line 07). If the timer is large enough, non-faulty processes will receive
the coordinator’s aux message before broadcasting their own aux message using the same binary
value if valid.
Non-faulty processes then wait until (n − t) valid aux messages have been received for the
round, before waiting on a second timer to expire (lines 08-09). If the timer is large enough it will
ensure all non-faulty processes receive valid signed aux messages from all non-faulty processes for
that round. If n− t of the signed aux messages support the same binary value bi = ri mod 2 then
the process decides bi. The process then continues on to the next round. Given that t < n/3, if
a non-faulty process receives n− t signed aux messages in round ri supporting bi, then any set of
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operation bin propose(vi) is
(01) ri ← 0; aux valuesi ← ∅;
(02) broadcast 〈(aux[ri](vi), θi), ∅〉; // Broadcast the initial proposal
(03) while (true) do
(04) ri ← ri + 1;
(05) if (i = (ri mod n)) then perform broadcast() end if; // Coordinator broadcasts before the timer
(06) Start timersi[ri × 2] if not yet done; wait until timersi[ri × 2] has expired;
(07) if (i 6= (ri mod n)) then perform broadcast() end if; // Non-coordinators broadcast after the timer
(08) wait until (n− t) valid aux[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t) different processes;
(09) Start timersi[ri × 2 + 1] if not yet done; wait until timersi[ri × 2 + 1] has expired;
(10) bi ← ri mod 2;
(11) if (n− t) valid aux[ri](bi) messages have been received from (n− t) different processes
(12) then decide(bi) if not yet done end if
(13) end while.
procedure perform broadcast() is
(14) valuesi ← compute valuesi as the set of binary values that satisfy the is valid predicate for
aux valuesi and round ri;
(15) bvi ← (ri + 1) mod 2;
(16) if received 〈(aux[ri](p val), θ(ri mod n))〉 from process p(ri mod n) where p val ∈ valuesi
(17) then esti ← p val // Support the coordinator’s value for the next round
(18) else if (bvi ∈ valuesi) then esti ← bvi // Otherwise prefer the modulo of the next/previous round
(19) else esti ← ¬bvi end if;
(20) proofsi ← compute proofsi as a set of signed aux messages from aux valuesi that satisfy the
is valid predicate for binary value esti and round ri;
(21) broadcast 〈(aux[ri](esti), θi), proofs〉.
when 〈(aux[rj ](estj), θj), proofs〉 is received
(22) if
(
is valid(rj , estj , proofs)
)
then
(23) proofs ← proofs\ {any messages in proofs not needed to satisfy the is valid predicate}.
(24) aux valuesi ← aux valuesi ∪ {
(
aux[rj ](estj), θj
)} ∪ proofs;
(25) end if;
(26) ρi ← the largest round for which aux valuesi contains t+ 1 messages from different processes;
(27) For all vi ∈ N such that vi ≤ ρi × 2, set timersi[vi] to expired if not yet done. // Catch-up mechanism
Figure 1: A safe algorithm for the binary Byzantine consensus in BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
n− t signed aux from round ri will contain at least one aux message supporting bi. With this, the
is valid predicate will ensure that ¬bi is not valid in any round after ri at all non-faulty processes. As
a result, in all following rounds, non-faulty processes will only broadcast aux messages supporting
bi and decide in round ri or a following round.
Lines 14-21 describe the perform broadcast procedure used to create and broadcast valid signed
aux messages for each round. The procedure starts by using the is valid predicate to compute the
set of valid binary values for round ri given the set aux values i of valid aux messages received
so far (line 14). Lines 16-19 are used to decide which of these values to broadcast. First, if a
valid aux message from the round coordinator was used, then that value is broadcast(lines 16-17).
Second, (ri + 1) mod 2 is chosen if it is valid (line 18), otherwise the only remaining valid value is
chosen (line 19). By prefering the binary value of the coordinator, termination is ensured when a
non-faulty process is chosen as the coordinator and if large enough timeouts are eventually used,
as all non-faulty processes broadcast the same binary value. Note that the protocol would remain
correct if lines 18-19 were changed so that the process simply chooses a random valid value to
broadcast, but they are included as they encourage non-faulty processes to support the same value
and reach a decision even without the presence of the coordinator.
Lines 22-27 describe what happens when a signed aux message and its proofs are received. If
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predicate is valid(r, est, proofs) is
(01) if (r = 0) then return(true) end if;
(02) if (r = 1) then
(03) if (∃ signed messages aux[0](est) from t+ 1 different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
else return(false)
end if;
(04) end if;
(05) b← (r − 1) mod 2;
(06) if (b = est) then
(07) if (r = 2 ∧ ∃ signed messages aux[0](b) from t+ 1 different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
(08) else if (∃ signed messages aux[r − 2](b) from n− t different processes in proofs)
then return(true);
(09) end if;
(10) else
(11) if (∃ signed messages aux[r − 1](¬b) from n− t different processes in proofs)
then return(true)
end if;
(12) end if;
(13) return(false).
Figure 2: Algorithm for the is valid predicate.
the is valid predicate indicates that this message is valid then the signed aux message and its proofs
are added to the aux values i set (lines 22-24). Line 24 ensures that no invalid messages are added
to aux values i. Next ρi is computed as the largest round for which the process has received at least
t+ 1 valid signed aux messages from different processes (line 25). The process then sets all timers
up to round ρi as expired. The threshold of t+ 1 ensures that at least one non-faulty processes has
reached round ρi, then setting the timeouts up to this round as expired helps this process catch up
to the faster ones.
Is valid predicate description. Figure 2 describes the is valid predicate that is called by Al-
gorithm 1 to check if a binary value is valid. It takes as input a round r, a binary value est and a
set of signed aux messages proofs. As previously mentioned, the predicate should return true if
proofs ensures that (i) est was proposed by a non-faulty process and (ii) ¬est has not been decided
by any non-faulty process in any round before r. Otherwise false should be returned.
For round 0 the predicate immediately returns true as any initial proposal is valid (line 01).
For round 1, as no value can be decided in round 0, the predicate returns true if proofs contains
at least t+ 1 round 0 messages with binary value est (line 03), i.e. if (i) is satisfied.
For all other rounds the value b← (r − 1) mod 2 is computed. Note that b is the binary value
that could be decided in round r − 1. If (b = est) then true is returned in the following cases.
1. r = 2 and proofs contains at least t + 1 signed aux[0](est) messages. If r = 2 and b = est
then est = 1 and by 11-12 of Figure 1 only 1 could have been decided in rounds r < 2. Thus,
if proofs contains at least t+1 signed aux[0](est) then both (i) and (ii) are satisfied and true
is returned (line 07).
2. r > 2 and proofs contains at least n − t signed aux[r − 2](est) messages. By lines 11-12
of Figure 1, in round r − 2 only ¬b could have been decided. Furthermore, if n − t signed
aux[r − 2](b) are contained in proofs then all sets of n− t signed aux messages from round
r − 2 must contain at least one aux[r − 2](b) message, thus ¬b could not have been decided
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by a non-faulty process in round r − 2. An induction argument can then be used to show
that ¬b could not have been decided in any round before r− 2 so true is returned (line 08).
Otherwise if (b = ¬est) then true is returned only if n− t signed aux[r − 1](est) messages are
received (line 11). This is enough to ensure ¬est was not decided in round r − 1 or before using
the same argument as case 2 above. If none of these cases are met the false is returned.
3.2.1 Timers
The timers used on lines 06 and 09 of Figure 1 are used to ensure processes eventually execute rounds
synchronously given 3Synch. The duration of the timers must increase by (at least) a constant
amount in every constant number of rounds to ensure that they are eventually large enough to
encompass the bound given by 3Synch and that slow non-faulty processes can catch up to the
faster ones. The faster the timeout increases, the fewer rounds will be needed to reach synchrony,
but the longer process might have to wait unnecessarily. Finding this ideal trade-off would require
a detailed inspection of the specific case where the algorithm is expected to run. Fortunately, as
this algorithm uses a weak coordinator, in most cases it does not need a coordinator or timeouts
to terminate (in fact the experiments in Section 4.1 never actually needed to use a coordinator).
Given this it is suggested to set the timeouts to 0 and disable lines 16-17 of the perform broadcast
procedure that are used to support the coordinator for some constant number of rounds. If the
algorithm does not terminate quickly in this case then it is suggested to set the timeout at the
expected average network delay of the system, and increase it by a small constant each following
round.
3.3 Proofs.
This section shows that the algorithm presented in Figure 1 solves the Binary consensus problem
in BAMPn,t[t < n/3,3Synch] through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. For a given round r there can be at most one binary value b for which there exists at
least n− t signed aux[r](b) messages from different processes.
Proof. This follows from the fact that there are at most t < n/3 faulty processes and that non-faulty
processes sign and broadcast at most one aux message per round.
Lemma 2. In round r > 0 non-faulty processes will only sign and broadcast aux messages con-
taining binary values proposed by non-faulty processes.
Proof. By line 13 of Figure 1 a non-faulty process will only broadcast values that satisfy the is valid
predicate. By lines 03, 07, 08, 11 of the is valid predicate, in any round r > 0 a binary value
will only satisfy the predicate if the process has received at least t + 1 signed aux messages from
different processes. Given that there are at most t faults and by induction, non-faulty processes
will only broadcast values proposed by non-faulty processes.
Lemma 3. All non-faulty processes decide the same value.
Proof. Assume a non-faulty process decides in round rx. By line 11 the process must have received
n − t signed aux[rx](rx mod 2) messages from different processes and decided vx = (rx) mod 2.
Also by line 11 for this or a different non-faulty process to decide ¬vx, the process must receive
n − t signed aux[ry](¬vx) messages from different processes in some round ry. Furthermore by
lines 10 and 11, in round a round r only (r) mod 2 can be decided, thus ry 6= rx.
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First assume ry > rx. By Lemma 1 no process will receive n− t signed aux[rx](¬vx) messages
from different processes and by line 14 a non-faulty process will only sign and broadcast a value that
satisfies the is valid predicate. Given that there are less than n − t signed aux[rx](¬vx) messages
from different processes, ¬vx will not be valid in either round rx + 1 or rx + 2 (lines 08, 11 of the
is valid predicate), thus messages supporting ¬vx will not be added to aux values i on line 24 of
Figure 1 for those rounds, and will not be broadcast by non-faulty processes (by lines 14, 20, 21).
Given no non-faulty process broadcasts ¬vX in rounds rx + 1 or rx + 2, the is valid predicate will
ensure ¬vx will remain invalid in later rounds and will not be broadcast by non-faulty processes in
round after rx + 2 (note that the case on line 02 of the is valid predicate does not apply as ry > 0,
and neither does the case on line 07 because if ry = 2 then ¬vx 6= 1). Thus no non-faulty process
will decide ¬vx in a round after rx.
Next assume ry < rx. If a process receives n−t signed aux[ry](¬vx) from different processes and
decides ¬vx in round ry then using the same argument as above, no non-faulty process will receive
n − t signed aux[rx](vx) in any following round and will not decide vx. Thus by contradiction no
process will decide ¬vx in a round prior to rx.
Lemma 4. For any round r > 0 all non-faulty processes will (eventually) receive enough valid
messages to satisfy the is valid predicate of Figure 2 for the round.
Proof. By line 01 of the is valid predicate all signed round 0 aux messages are valid and by line 02
of Figure 1 all non-faulty processes sign and broadcast a round 0 aux message. All non-faulty
processes will then receive at least n − t signed round 0 aux messages from different processes.
Given that t < n/3, of these n− t messages at least t+ 1 messages supporting a single binary value
will be received, satisfying line 03 of the is valid predicate for round 1. All non-faulty processes will
then sign and broadcast a valid aux message for round 1 and advance to round 2.
In round 2 non-faulty processes will receive at least n − t signed valid round 1 aux messages
from different processes. If n − t of these messages are of the form aux[1](0), then by line 11 of
Figure 2 the is valid predicate is satisfied for round 2. Otherwise, at least one of the valid signed
aux messages must be of the form aux[1](1). By line 22 of Figure 1 this message must contain
proofs generated by the is valid predicate supporting binary value 1 for round 1. This can only
happen on line 03 of Figure 2 by including t+ 1 messages of the form aux[0](1). Notice then that
by line 07 these proofs also satisfy the is valid predicate for round 2. Thus, all non-faulty processes
will then sign and broadcast a valid aux message for round 2 and advance to round 3.
Now assume by induction all non-faulty processes have received enough valid messages to satisfy
the is valid predicate for a round r−1. All processes will then sign and broadcast a valid aux message
on line 21 of Figure 1 and advance to round r. Following this all non-faulty processes will receive
at least n − t valid signed aux messages from round r − 1. If n − t of these messages are of the
form aux[r − 1](r mod 2) then the is valid predicate for round r is satisfied by line 11 of Figure 2.
Otherwise, at least one of the valid signed aux messages must be of the form aux[r−1](¬(r mod 2)).
By line 22 of Figure 1 this message must contain proofs generated by the is valid predicate sup-
porting binary value ¬(r mod 2) for round r − 1. For this, on line 05 of Figure 2 we have
b = ((r − 2) mod 2), or equivalently b = (r mod 2) and est = ¬(r mod 2), i.e. est 6= b. There-
fore by line 11 the proofs for message aux[r − 1](¬(r mod 2)) must be n− t messages of the form
aux[r−2](¬(r mod 2)). Now consider the is valid predicate with input round r and est = ¬r mod 2,
or equivalently est = ((r− 1) mod 2), in this case the predicate is satisfied by n− t messages of the
form aux[r − 2](¬(r mod 2)) (line 08), which is exactly the set of proofs that were included in the
aux[r − 1](¬r mod 2) message, completing the induction proof.
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Lemma 5. Let r be the smallest round in which a non-faulty process decides. All non-faulty
processes will decide in either round r or r + 2.
Proof. Given line 11 of Figure 1, a non-faulty process decides v = (r) mod 2 in round r after
receiving n − t signed aux[r](v) from different processes. By Lemma 1 no process will receive
n − t signed aux[r](¬v) messages from different processes, thus by Lemma 3, ¬v will not satisfy
the is valid predicate in round any round after r. From this and by Lemma 4, in all rounds after
r the is valid predicate on line 14 will return {v} and all non-faulty processes will broadcast aux
messages supporting v. Thus by line 08 of Figure 1 a non-faulty process will wait until it receives
n− t signed aux[r + 2](v) messages from different processes, and decide on line 12.
Lemma 6. If all non-faulty processes execute synchronous rounds, then termination is ensured
within O(t) rounds.
Proof. All non-faulty processes executing synchronous rounds will receive all messages from all n−t
non-faulty in the round before preceding to the next round. Now given two consecutive synchronous
rounds r and r+1, where coordinators p(ri mod n) and p(r+1 mod n) are non-faulty processes, all non-
faulty processes will broadcast aux messages with the same binary value in rounds r+ 1 and r+ 2
(i.e. the value broadcast by the coordinators by line 17 of Figure 1) and decide in either round r
or r+ 1. Given that there are at most t faulty processes and t < n/3, two consecutive rounds that
have non-faulty coordinators will be reached after at most O(t) rounds.
Lemma 7. Given the 3Synch assumption, all non-faulty processes eventually execute synchronous
rounds.
Proof. As described in Section 3.2.1 the timer for any round r is larger than the timer for round
r− 1 by at least some constant α. By the timers on lines 06, 09 of Figure 1 and that the threshold
for skipping a timer (line 26) is t+ 1, no non-faulty process will reach round r faster than the sum
of all the timeouts (as given by the fastest non-faulty process bounded by 3Synch) of the previous
rounds. Thus to reach round r, a non-faulty process must have waited at least
∑j<r
j=0 2× j×α units
of time for timers to expire (i.e a polynomial number of time units).
Now given that a non-faulty process will only start the timer on line 09 for round r once it has
received n − t messages and that t < n/3, the process must have received messages from at least
t + 1 non-faulty processes for round r when it starts the timer. Thus all non-faulty processes will
receive t + 1 messages from round r within a constant bound c given by 3Synch and by line 27
will skip all timeouts until round r and reach the round in a bound given by c× r (i.e. in a linear
amount of time units).
As follows, the fastest non-faulty process reaches round r in a polynomial amount of time
bounded by 3Synch, and the slowest non-faulty process reaches round r in a linear amount of time
bounded by 3Synch. Given that a polynomial function grows faster than a linear one, eventually
the slowest non-faulty processes will reach a round r early enough so that all non-faulty processes
receive messages from all other non-faulty processes (given 3Synch) before any non-faulty process
progresses to round r+1. Furthermore once this threshold is reached it hold for all following rounds
(given 3Synch).
Theorem 1. The algorithm presented in Figure 1 solves the Binary consensus problem in BAMPn,t[t <
n/3,3Synch].
Proof. First recall the definition of Binary Byzantine Consensus.
• BBC-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
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• BBC-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• BBC-Validity. If all non-faulty processes propose the same value, no other value can be
decided.
Lemma 5 ensures that if a non-faulty process decides then all non-faulty processes decide, while
Lemmas 6 and 7 ensure all non-faulty processes decide in the presence 3Synch, thus ensuring BBC-
Termination. BBC-Agreement and BBC-Validity are ensured by Lemmas 2 and 3 respectively.
4 Implementation and experiments.
Stopping and garbage collection. The algorithm shown in Figure 1 continues to execute
rounds forever. To avoid this, if a non-faulty process decides in round r it can simply broadcast a
”proof” of decision, containing the n− t messages that allowed it to decide and stop immediately.
Furthermore, the broadcast of this message may be delayed until the process receives a valid message
from another process from round r + 1, ensuring that if all processes decide in round r then no
extra messages will be sent. Note that, in implementation, a process can not be immediately
garbage collected as it needs to ensure that its messages are reliably delivered (reliable channels
are often implemented through the use of re-transmissions when needed). Fortunately, in a system
that is executing multiple consensus instances, garbage collection of earlier instances can be easily
coordinated in later instances (this is not described here as it depends on the requirements of the
specific system).
Timeouts and coordinators. As described in Section 3.2.1, the algorithm does not always
need to use timeouts or a coordinator to terminate. Disabling timeouts and not using the round
coordinator until round 10 was found to be a good trade-off, allowing the algorithm to terminate
quickly, while still ensuring progress.
Cryptographic signatures and validity proofs. Like timeouts and coordinators, including
proofs of validity with messages is necessary for the correctness of the algorithm, but are not often
needed in the expected case. In fact in the presence of reliable channels the validity proofs are
needed only in the case of Byzantine faults. Given this, for efficiency an implementation may
choose not to include proofs with messages by default and instead have processes request proofs
from the sender of the message if the recipient cannot validate the message itself. Notice that this
does not effect the correctness of the algorithm, but only increases the needed synchrony window
to include enough time for a non-faulty process to request and receive missing proofs from other
non-faulty processes.
Threshold signatures. Another way to implement validity proofs efficiently is through the use
of threshold signatures [12, 13, 14, 34]. When using threshold signatures, a set of signatures of the
same message from different processes can be combined into a single shared signature. In the case of
this algorithm n− t threshold signatures can be used, allowing the validity proof to be reduced to a
single value in most cases. To enable threshold signatures, a distributed key generation protocol is
usually required to be executed before the first consensus iteration in order to compute the shared
keys.
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4.1 Experiments
The algorithm has been implemented using the Go [21] programming language. Reliable channels
are implemented by using message re-transmission. All received messages are stored to disk in an
append only log allowing processes to recover after a failure. Signatures are implemented using the
ECDSA implementation included in the Go standard library [22]. Proofs of validity are transmitted
on request of the recipient as described previously.
The experiments were run on Amazon EC2 using from 75 to 300 c5.large instances (4 GiB of
memory, 2 vCPUs, EBS backed storage). The instances were spread evenly across EC2’s 15 regions
in Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, and South America.
In the experiments each node chooses a random initial binary proposal using a threshold given by
the experiment, then run consensus 10 times. Results are then calculated as the average of the those
runs. The thresholds are chosen as 25, 50, and 75 percent, where for example 25 percent would
mean approximately 25 percent of nodes choose 1 and their initial proposal with the remaining
nodes choosing 0. All nodes are non-faulty.
Figure 3 shows the results of the experiment. Figure 3(a) shows the average latency of exe-
cuting a single consensus instance, Figure 3(b) shows the average termination round the consensus
instances, Figure 3(c) shows the average number of messages sent for a single consensus instance
for all nodes.
Given that the consensus can decide 1 on round 1 and 0 on round 2, with 75 percent 1 proposals
termination happens on the first round, and with 25 percent 1 proposals termination happens on
the second round. With 50 percent 1 proposals and given the randomization of the experiment, the
termination round varies in each case, but stays below 2 on average. A maximum termination round
of 8 was observed. The latency is related directly to the termination round, with 195 milliseconds
being the minimum latency and 293 milliseconds being the maximum latency. Increasing the
number of nodes from 75 to 300 had minimal impact on latency. The number of messages sent is
quadratic to the number of nodes multiplied by the number of rounds.
(a) Latency (b) Termination round (c) Messages sent
Figure 3: Experiment results varying the number of instances and the number of initial 1 proposals.
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